By Godwin Onuh Odeh PhD The specter of US military intervention in Nigeria, sparked by President Donald Trump's threats to...
By Godwin Onuh Odeh PhD
The specter of US military intervention in Nigeria, sparked by President Donald Trump's threats to combat alleged Christian genocide and terrorists, has ignited intense diplomatic debates and raised critical questions that touches on strategy, sovereignty, and efficacy. Moving beyond simplistic bombing campaigns, this piece explores advanced warfare tactics and strategic considerations for US involvement (if pursued), emphasizing all encompassing approaches that prioritize minimizing collateral damage, respecting Nigerian sovereignty, and addressing root causes of insecurity.
Essentially the geography of the crisis in Nigeria is north east and north west respectively.This defines the insecurity landscape. In other words, the Boko Haram and ISWAP drive violence in northeast Nigeria, with banditry and farmer-herder clashes escalating in north-central regions. The victims of attack are both Christians and Muslims , with Christians feeling the greatest impact as extremists often frame campaigns as anti-Western/Christian.
On the diplomatic plank, Nigeria’s government insists on collaborative security partnerships, rejecting unilateral intervention. The Statement or reactions from President Tinubu, Civil Society and some scholars emphasizes mutual respect and territorial integrity.
On the US stance, President Donald Trump threatens "fast, vicious, and sweet" military action if Nigeria doesn’t curb the alleged Christian killings. Nigeria has in short grapple with the challenges for over a decade, a period longer than was expected as at 2009. Thus , the Pentagon prepares contingency plans involving ground troops or airstrikes to help in crusade against terrorists.
It is against this background this treatise on Advanced Warfare Tactics and the need to go beyond conventional bombing becomes germane. Key components and tactics in advance warfare strategy are articulated thus:
1. Precision-Guided Munitions and Drone Strikes. Targeted Airstrikes should Use Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) or Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) to minimize civilian casualties when striking high-value Boko Haram/ISWAP targets (e.g., bomb-making facilities, leadership hideouts). Also, Armed Drones (MQ-9 Reaper) Conduct persistent surveillance and kinetic strikes against mobile terrorist cells, leveraging real-time ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance). The limitations here entails risk of signature strikes gone wrong; need robust human intelligence to avoid hitting civilian-populated areas.
2. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Insertion. Hostage Rescue and CT Ops: Deploy Navy SEALs/Delta Force for high-risk hostage rescues (e.g., schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram) or decapitation strikes against militant leaders. Essential here , is the Train and Advise (TAA) Missions. US must partner with Nigerian SOF (e.g., 72nd Special Forces Battalion) to enhance counterterrorism (CT) skills, emphasizing urban warfare and intel-driven ops.
As fruitful as this might be, the fundamental challenges have been grand corruption. Nigerian military corruption/factionalism could undermine partnership trust; SOF need local language assets and cultural advisors.
3. Cyber and EW Operations. Information and communication is a powerful tools. So, there is a need to disrupt terror networks. Conduct offensive cyber ops to disable Boko Haram/ISWAP, bandit's communications, financing (e.g., jamming crypto wallets), and propaganda dissemination. In short, the place of Electronic Warfare (EW) cannot be overemphasized. Deploy airborne EW pods (e.g., EC-130H Compass Call) to jam insurgent comms/radar while protecting US/Nigerian forces. The risks associated here is collateral disruption of civilian infrastructure; potential escalation if terrorists retaliate via hacktivism.
4. AI-Driven Predictive Analytics. AI has actually come to stay and the US is not a novice to this while Nigeria is just starting to learn. Here there is Predictive Targeting. This entails leveraging on machine learning algorithms (e.g., Palantir Gotham) to fuse HUMINT, SIGINT, and geospatial data to predict insurgent movements and preempt attacks. This too is not without its own limitations which include overreliance on data quality; risk of false positives leading to fratricide or civilian harm.
Arising from the strategic considerations and apparent inherent shortcomings the piece advocate for moving beyond Kinetic Action. What should be done here are as follows:
1. Prioritize Collaborative Security Partnerships.There should be Joint Planning Cells. Embed US personnel in Nigerian National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) to co-develop ops plans, ensuring Nigerian "ownership" of strategy. For optimum outcome, there is need to equip and train Nigerian Forces through provisioning of non-lethal aid (e.g., MRAPs, night vision, encrypted radios) + targeted CT training (e.g., urban sieges, bomb disposal). This is crucial because, unilateral strikes breed anti-Western sentiment; partnership ought to builds local capacity.
2. Address Root Causes (Not Just Symptoms) of the crisis. Socio-economic depravation as argued in some quarters has been key to conflicts in Nigeria.
As part of security climate initiatives, funding solar-powered boreholes, drought-resistant crops, and pastoralist conflict-mitigation programmes would reduce farmer-herder clashes.
The is economic development handle here. USAID grants should target at rebuilding schools/churches in conflict zones, promote interfaith dialogue, and create jobs to undermine extremist recruitment. Some of these have been done by the federal government, some state governors in the insecurity ravaged states and zones, but still things continue falling apart.
Very crucial here is renewed diplomatic engagement. The presidency should push for Nigerian-led national reconciliation conferences to address governance deficits and ethno-religious tensions. On this note, the report of the 2015 National Conference should be dusted. President Tinubu appears to have tried in this case as opinions have that he implemented some parts of the report.
3. Mitigate Sovereignty Concerns. UN Mandate or African Union Backing is crucial for the legality of the enterprise. There is need to seek UN Security Council resolution (UNSC) endorsement. The aim is US-Nigeria partnership (vs. unilateral Trump directive) would legitimized intervention. On this note, public messaging would be done to frame US role as "supporting Nigerian-led solutions" (per Tinubu’s requests), emphasizing humanitarian outcomes (e.g., freeing captives, protecting IDPs).
4. There is a Post-Kinetic Stabilization phase . Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Teams becomes compelling and imperative. The US Army Civil Affairs units has to be deployed to rebuild critical infrastructure (e.g., healthcare, schools) in cleared areas. Thereafter, reintegration programmes would be kickstart. There should be allocation for fund DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration) for low-level fighters, offering vocational training or farming cooperatives to prevent re-radicalization.
From the foregoing, here are risks and mitigation strategy to check
escalation (e.g., ISWAP reprisals). One, establishment of clear ROE (Rules of Engagement); coordinate with Nigerian ops center to deconflict strikes and two, there should be Civilian Casualties Mandate of 30-day post-strike assessments.The aim is to compensate victims via USAID
Anti-Western Blowback Limit footprint; emphasize Nigerian command of ops; fund counter-narrative messaging via local media
and Partner Force Abuses, Vet Nigerian units via Leahy Law; embed monitors with partner battalions.
On the whole,
while bombing campaigns offer short-term tactical gains, sustainable security in Nigeria demands layered strategies blending advanced warfare (precision strikes, SOF, cyber) with diplomatic-economic investments.The US must note the following: i. default to partnership knowing that there should be no unilateral strikes. Co-develop plans with Tinubu’s team;
ii. Target root causes. Fund climate adaptation, interfaith dialogue, and equitable governance;
iii.Minimize footprint. Use drones/SOF over large ground deployments; prioritize training locals; and
iv. Frame as Humanitarian Support. Emphasize freeing hostages, protecting civilians, and rebuilding communities.
In short, bombing alone risks repeating mistakes (of Somalia, Libya etc). A hybrid approach—kinetic when unavoidable, but focused on long-term stabilization—is the path beyond mere bombing. This becomes necessary because as Armstrong Matiu Adejo of the blessed memory argues , " the objective of conflict resolution is not to eliminate the conflict as Chris Garba maintains, but to remove the fundamental causes of crisis, to remove the factors that actually caused the conflict, to the satisfaction of the parties in conflict" ( A. M., Adejo, " History , Conflict Resolution and National Unity in Nigeria " in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, (1)1, 2004, p. 6). Dr. Godwin Onuh Odeh, Department of History and International Studies, Sokoto State University, Sokoto Nigeria.
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