On 26 September 2026, The Gambia will mark 30 years since it held the first election of the Second Republic in 1996. Despite a m...
On 26 September 2026, The Gambia will mark 30 years since it held the first election of the Second Republic in 1996. Despite a military rupture in 1994, the country has sustained electoral continuity for three decades. This makes The Gambia a unique case in West Africa: a state that experienced authoritarian rule, an attempted democratic reversal, and yet returned to civilian constitutional order without another coup.
This essay reflects on that trajectory. It highlights how Captain Yahya Jammeh both initiated the 1996 transition and later attempted to truncate democracy in 2016. It further argues that African states currently under military rule — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — should learn from The Gambia’s experience. Military government worldwide lacks legitimacy, accountability, and checks and balances. Democracy, with all its imperfections, remains the only people-oriented system of government.
The Gambia became a Republic on 24 April 1970. The Republican constitution that came into force that year paved the way for Sir Dawda Jawara as the first President. For nearly 24 years, The Gambia practiced multiparty politics, held regular elections, and maintained civil liberties. It was often cited as one of Africa’s most stable democracies. That stability ended on 22 July 1994 when junior officers led by Captain Yahya Jammeh overthrew Jawara. The military suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and promised a transition to civilian rule. Like many coups on the continent, it was presented as a corrective intervention. In reality, it concentrated power in the hands of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council.
By 1995, Jammeh’s government, under domestic and international pressure, set up a transition committee. A new constitution was drafted and approved by referendum on 8 August 1996 with more than 70 per cent of the people in support of it as the fundamental law of the country's Second Republic. Presidential and parliamentary elections followed. On 26 September 1996, Jammeh contested on the platform of the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) as a civilian candidate and won, ushering in the Second Republic. Other opposition parties that contested were: the United Democratic Party (UDP) with Ousainou Darboe as presidential candidate, the National Reconciliation Party (NRP) led by Hamat Bah, and the People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS) led by Sidia Jatta. The opposition parties, as it were, failed to chart a united front and mount sufficient pressure on the APRC, limiting themselves to accusing the flag bearer of human rights abuses and intolerance toward political opponents. However, from 1996 to 2016, The Gambia continued to hold elections without interruption. This electoral continuity is important to the health of democracy in Africa. However, it was largely electoral authoritarianism. Civil society was repressed, opposition figures were intimidated, independent media was shut down, and state institutions served the presidency. The lesson here is that elections alone do not equal democracy. Without liberal safeguards, elections can legitimize autocracy.
Ironically, in December 2016 there was a direct attempt to truncate democracy, but that move was defeated. Jammeh, who had been in power for 22 years, contested the presidential election and was defeated by Adama Barrow, the candidate of a united opposition coalition. Barrow polled 43.29% to Jammeh’s 39.64%. Jammeh initially conceded on national television. A week later, he reversed his concession and declared that he would not relinquish power, citing alleged electoral irregularities. That was a direct attempt to truncate democracy.
What followed tested both Gambian resilience and regional commitment to constitutional order. ECOWAS, with diplomatic backing from the AU and UN, insisted on the inauguration of Barrow. Faced with regional military pressure, Jammeh went into exile in Equatorial Guinea in January 2017 and Barrow was sworn in. The 2016 electoral episode proved two things: first, that even entrenched incumbents can be voted out; second, that democracy survives when citizens, political parties, and regional institutions defend the ballot. In 2021, Barrow was re-elected with 53.23% of the vote and a turnout of over 89%, signaling high political consciousness among Gambians.
The political experience provides lessons for Nigeria and contemporary Africa. Today, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are under military-led regimes. The justification is often the same: insecurity, corruption, and failure of civilian governance. Despite the inherent weaknesses of Jammeh’s administration, The Gambia’s 1996 transition provides a reference point. He initiated a transition package that returned the country to elections within two years. For countries currently under military rule, that model shows that a military government can set a clear timetable and exit. But The Gambia also warns us: a transition without constitutional reform and institutional checks can produce elected autocrats rather than democracy.
More fundamentally, the military is not a better option than democracy. Globally, military governments lack three hallmarks of democratic governance. First is legitimacy, because power does not flow from the consent of the governed. Second is accountability, because there are no regular elections to remove underperforming leaders. Third are checks and balances, because the judiciary, legislature, and civil society are subordinated to the command hierarchy.
In short, democracy may be slow and messy, but it is self-correcting. Nigeria’s uninterrupted civilian rule since 1999, despite economic and security challenges, has allowed for alternation of power, policy debate, and institutional growth. That is what The Gambia reclaimed in 2017, and what other African states must protect.
As The Gambia approaches 2026, the record is mixed, with both gains and challenges. On the positive side, freedom of expression has expanded, civil society is more active, and elections are becoming competitive. Voter turnout also remains high. On the other hand, key reforms have stalled. The 2020 draft constitution, which proposed presidential term limits and stronger judicial independence, was not enacted. Similarly, recommendations of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission are yet to be fully implemented. If The Gambia addresses these gaps, it can move from electoral continuity to democratic consolidation. If not, it risks stagnation.
Almost thirty years after 1996, The Gambia’s story is not one of uninterrupted liberal democracy. It is a story of interrupted civilian rule, followed by 30 years of uninterrupted elections, and rescued from authoritarian reversal in 2016. The central lessons for Nigeria and Africa are clear. First, there is a need to guard and sustain democracy. Second, military rule may promise order, but it cannot deliver legitimacy or accountability. Third, transitions must be time-bound, civilian-led, and anchored in constitutional reform, as was attempted in The Gambia in 1996.
Democracy is not destiny. It is a choice. The Gambia made that choice in 2016 when it rejected the truncation of the people’s will. Other African nations facing military rule must make the same choice. Nations should be returned to the people, and let the people decide. However, as Toyin Falola argued, the fundamental crisis of African politics is not a lack of capable leaders, but weak institutions that fail to check corruption, patronage, and the concentration of power. This observation by a leading African scholar of our time should be taken to heart. I wish Africa a healthy and robust democracy in the 21st century.
Godwin Onuh Odeh, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of History and International Studies, Sokoto State University, Nigeria
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